Several cases of category-specific semantic deficits for living things have now been reported, most of whom have a greater difficulty with knowledg e of visual properties of living things than with non-visual properties. This has motivated two different kinds of account of category-specific deficits for living things. One account is that the impairment for living things arises as a result of general damage to visual properties, and so it predicts that impairment for visual properties of living things will be accompanied by some degree of impairment for visual properties of other categories. The second account posits explicit category-based organisation of semantic memory, such that visual properties of living and non-living things are stored separately, and so can be independently impaired. We investigated the semantic impairment of a patient SE, who had received a diagnosis of herpes simplex encephalitis several years previously, resulting in a mild category-specific semantic deficit for living things. Both off-line and on-line tasks revealed that SE had a highly selective impairment for the visual properties of living things, with no sign of problems for the visual properties of non-living things. This raises a challenge for models in which category-specific deficits emerge as a result of a general deficit determined by some other factor. We suggest one way in which these models may account for the data by encoding inter-relations between the function and form of objects in semantic memory.
INTRODUCTION
Selective impairments of knowledge about objects in a specific semantic category are among the most striking patterns of cognitive deficit to have been reported in the neuropsychological literature. The most commonly affected semantic category appears to be living things; several patients have shown selective difficulties with the meanings of words and concepts within the domain of living things, accompanied by relatively intact knowledge of concepts in other semantic categories, such as man-made objects (e.g. Hart & Gordon, 1992; Hillis & Caramazza, 1991; Sartori & Job, 1988; Sartori, Job, & Coltheart, 1993a; Sheridan & Humphreys, 1993; Warrington & Shallice, 1984) . Category-specifi c deficits for living things usually, although not invariably, result from herpes simplex encephalitis (HSE) infection. Although the reverse pattern has also been reported (better preserved knowledge of living things than other categories), this is rarer, and generally associated with aetiologies other than HSE (Hillis & Caramazza, 1991; Sacchett & Humphreys, 1992; Warrington & McCarthy, 1987) .
In their seminal study of four patients with category-specific deficits for living things, Warrington and Shallice (1984) suggested that the basis for this pattern of impairment may be the differential weighting of certain types of semantic property for the representations of words in different categories. Most importantly, for living things our concepts are based largely on what they look like, so that visual properties are the most salient in discriminating among members of a category. For example, the most salient feature of leopards is that they have spots, and we use this information to distinguish leopards from similar animals such as tigers and lions. In contrast, conceptual representations of human-made objects are more dependent on non-visual properties, especially attributes relevant to their design or function. If the brain damage caused by the HSE infection has the effect of disrupting visual properties in semantic memory, then this will have a more adverse effect on the knowledge of living than non-living things.
This hypothesis has gained support from several studies of patients with category-specific deficits for living things, who have all demonstrated the predicted pattern of a greater problem for visual than nonvisual semantic properties (De Renzi & Lucchelli, 1994; Farah, Hammond, Mehta & Ratcliff, 1989; Hart & Gordon, 1992; Sartori & Job, 1988; Sartori et al., 1993a; Sartori, Job, Miozzo, Zago, & Marchiori, 1993b; Silveri & Gainotti, 1988) . There is also converging evidence from studies of unimpaired subjects that visual/perceptual properties are particularly important for the identification of living things (e.g. Keil, 1994; Price & Humphreys, 1989) and that function is crucial to our concepts of artefacts (Barton & Komatsu, 1989; Keil, 1994 , although see Malt & Johnson, 1992 , for a counter-argument).
However, it is possible to identify two different versions of the claim that category-specific deficits for living things arise from damage to visual properties in semantic memory. The first variant is that specific areas of the brain are committed to the representation of concepts for living things, as a result of their reliance on visual information, and therefore on visual sensory input channels. Different brain areas will become responsible for the representations of concepts in other categories, such as human-made objects, which depend more heavily on other kinds of semantic property (Farah et al., 1989; Gainotti, Silveri, Daniele, & Guistolisi, 1995; McCarthy & Warrington, 1988; Warrington & McCarthy, 1987) . Thus damage to one area of the brain will selectively affect knowledge of one category, whereas damage to other areas will leave that category unscathed and affect other domains. The brain area generally thought to be responsible for knowledge of living things is the temporo-limbic system, especially in the left cerebral hemisphere (Gainotti et al., 1995; Pietrini et al., 1988; Sartori et al., 1993a) , which is the area most consistently affected by the HSE virus. The alternative hypothesis is that the differential weighting of visual and non-visual properties does not lead to localisation of semantic categories in different areas of the brain, but rather that the category-specific deficit for living things emerges as the result of general damage to visual properties. This affects living things more than other categories because of their greater reliance on this kind of information. This is the most straightforward interpretation of Warrington and Shallice's original account, and is modelled in Farah and McClelland's (1991) connectionist implementation, in which representations of items in different categories are distributed across visual and non-visual property nodes in varying proportions. Although this account does not assume that representations of living and non-living things are stored in different areas of the brain, it is still consistent with the neuroanatomical evidence that damage to the temporo-limbic system is correlated with impairments of visual semantic knowledge-the difference is that this damage should affect visual knowledge of all categories.
Although these two hypotheses are based on the same general premise of different weightings of visual and non-visual semantic properties for living and non-living things, they make opposing claims, not only about the localisation of semantic categories in the brain, but also about the precise patterns of impairment that should arise when visual properties are damaged. On the former "localised" account, semantic representations in different categories come to be stored separately and so it would be possible for brain damage to impair knowledge of visual properties of living things independently of visual properties of non-living things. So, for example, a patient may be unable to retrieve the visual properties of living things (e.g. that a leopard has spots, that a penguin is black and white and has small wings) but have no difficulty at all in retrieving the visual properties of non-living things (e.g. that teaspoons are silver in colour, that cars have wheels and doors at the side). On this account it would also be possible for brain damage to affect other types of semantic information limited by both category and information type, such as the nonvisual properties of living things only, as recently reported for patient SE by Laws, Evans, Hodges, and McCarthy (1995) .
The "distributed" account, in contrast, does not predict such selective, all-or-none effects. Whereas damage to visual properties should have the most severe consequences for living things, it should also have some discernible effect on the visual properties of non-living things. The effect on non-living things will be less catastrophic, because these concepts still contain a large number of intact non-visual properties, but if we were to probe specifically for the visual properties of non-living things, we would expect to see some gaps in knowledge. So, for example, a patient who cannot retrieve the information that leopards have spots should also have difficulty with the visual properties of non-living things (e.g. that teaspoons are silver). This prediction is clearly illustrated in the behaviour of Farah and McClelland's (1991) connectionist model. When the network was lesioned by removing a percentage of the visual features, or the connections between these features and other levels of representation, its "naming" performance was affected more severely for living than non-living things-as predicted. However, lesions to the visual features also affected the network's performance on the nonliving concepts. For example, the performance of the basic model on living things, as measured by how closely the semantic pattern it activated matched the target semantic pattern (dot product), ranged from .84 when 20% of the visual units were damaged, to .32 when 99% of the visual units were damaged. The values for the non-living things were .87 and .42 respectively, which is a significant, although slightly milder, deficit. Thus the model shows the gradation of impairment over different semantic categories that we would expect from a general loss of visual feature representations.
A variant of the "distributed" account has also been put forward by Riddoch and Humphreys and colleagues (Riddoch & Humphreys, 1987; Sheridan & Humphreys, 1993 ). On their model, the visual semantic properties of objects are stored in structural descriptions at a level of representation separate to the central semantic memory system (which stores non-visual semantic information). Category-specifi c deficits arise because the members of living thing categories tend to have more similar structural descriptions than members of artefact categories, because they have more shared visual properties. Any damage or noise at this level of representation will affect living things more significantly than non-living things because their greater similarity renders them more confusable. Our current experiments were not designed to distinguish between an account in which visual semantic properties are represented within the central semantic system or in a separate structural description system. For the current purposes the crucial point is that Riddoch and Humphreys' model, like that of Farah and McClelland, claims that the damage that causes category-specific deficits for living things is general in the sense that it affects visual semantic information across the board; all structural descriptions will be affected, but this will have greater impact on living things because of their similarity, while non-living things are more mildly impaired.
The general or distributed account and the localised category-specific account have not been clearly separated in the literature. Results have been presented for several patients indicating that they have a problem with the visual properties of living things, and the interpretation presented has usually been in terms of the localised account; i.e. that the problem with visual properties is limited to living things and there is no accompanying deficit for non-living things. However, close inspection of the data in several cases reveals that there is frequently some degree of impairment on visual properties of non-living things, with performance in this condition below that of the control range (e.g. Farah et al., 1989; Sartori et al., 1993b; Silveri & Gainotti, 1988) . The interpretation of data in these studies is also problematic because the familiarity of items tested in the living and non-living conditions is not closely matched. As has been pointed out by Funnell and Sheridan (1992) and Stewart, Parkin, and Hunkin (1992) , the familiarity of an object may be an important determinant of the extent to which its conceptual representation is degraded as a result of brain damage. Although there are reasons to doubt whether familiarity will turn out to be the sole predictor of patterns of impairment, with no role for other factors such as semantic category or type of semantic property (e.g. Sartori, Miozzo, & Job, 1993c) , it is certainly one of the factors that seems to affect the degree to which knowledge is impaired or preserved. Thus, in cases where familiarity is not adequately controlled, and the living things tested are systematically of lower familiarity than non-living things, we cannot rule out the possibility that patients are not so much having problems with the visual properties of living things, but with the visual properties of unfamiliar items in general. More convincing evidence of a truly selective deficit for the visual properties of living things comes from studies of Michaelangelo (Sartori & Job, 1988; Sartori et al., 1993a) and KR (Hart & Gordon, 1992) . In both cases, the patients' naming deficit was shown to be category-specific for living things when familiarity was held constant, and detailed testing of knowledge of visual and non-visual properties of living and non-living things suggested a selective deficit for the visual properties of living things only, which was not accompanied by any degree of impairment for the visual properties of non-living things. But even in these studies, it is not explicitly stated that familiarity was controlled in the tests of knowledge of visual properties; although it was controlled for in the naming studies, the materials were not identical across all the tasks, and so a confounding effect of object familiarity may have crept in. In another relevant study, Powell and Davidoff (1995) present data for a patient with cortical blindness, which they argue demonstrates a specific impairment for the visual properties of living things, when tested for a set of items closely matched not only for familiarity, but also for difficulty level for control subjects. However, although this patient was worse on the visual than the non-visual properties of living things, her performance was also poor for the visual properties of non-living items (and not significantly better than for living things), and so it is not possible to claim that this was a truly specific impairment for visual properties of living things.
In summary, it is not clear from earlier studies whether the patterns of impairment for patients with category-specific deficits for living things are more consistent with the localised or the distributed account of damage to visual semantic properties. This is mainly because the distinction between the two accounts has not been made explicit and so experiments have not been designed specifically to discriminate between them. However, one recent study does address this issue directly. De Renzi and Lucchelli (1994) present the case of Felicia, who is recovering from HSE infection and who shows the typical pattern of a semantic deficit that is more marked for living things than non-living things. Felicia also showed a specific problem for visual properties that was apparently confined to the category of living things. For example, her performance was significantly poorer for living than for non-living things in a shape decision task, in drawing from memory, and in attempting to describe the perceptual difference between pairs of exemplars (e.g. between a goat and a sheep or between a tie and a scarf)
1 . In interpreting these data, the authors (De Renzi & Lucchelli, 1994, p. 19) raise the question "If we assume that living things are no longer recognised because the retrieval of their visual properties is insufficient to ensure their discrimination, we are faced with the problem of why this inability does not result in the slightest impairment of object identification, even when the task is focused on shape identification (. . .) ?" In other words, a pattern of impairment in which damage to visual properties only affects living things does not seem to be consistent with the distributed account of representation; either we need to posit the separation of information according to explicit category boundaries (as on the localisation account), or we need additional assumptions about how information is represented on the distributed hypothesis, such that it can account for a selective all-or-none deficit of visual properties of living things. De Renzi and Lucchelli discuss one possible version of the latter approach. They suggest that the crucial difference in the structure of concepts for living and non-living things may not be simply that living things have a greater ratio of visual to non-visual properties than do non-living things, but that the bonds or interconnections among visual and non-visual properties are stronger for non-living things than they are for living things. In the case of human-made objects, the shape, constituent parts, and so on are all closely tied to the function for which the objects were designed; thus, many of the visual properties are dependent on non-visual properties. This does not apply in the case of living things, which were not designed with a specific human-related function in mind, and so correspondences between form and function are less close. If this is the case, general damage to visual properties may indeed have minimal effects on artefact concepts, because the resulting gaps in the representations can be "filled in" by inferences and cross-references from closely related functional properties. For example, one could answer the question "Does a cup have a handle?" without having direct access to the visual property "cups have handles" but by accessing the non-visual properties that cups are designed for drinking hot liquids from and inferring that they will therefore have a handle to avoid burning the fingers (see Wierzbiecka, 1985) .
In spite of this interesting extension of the distributed account to accommodate the relative preservation of visual properties of non-living things, another recent study presents even greater problems for this approach. As mentioned earlier, have reported data for a patient, SE, who appears to have a selective deficit for the non-visual, associative properties of living things. This cannot be explained if category-specific deficits of living things emerge as a result of general damage to visual semantic properties. SE's retrieval of the visual properties of living things was apparently intact. This pattern of impairment provides strong support for localised accounts in which semantic memory is fractionated according to both information type and semantic category.
In this paper we address a number of issues arising from this debate, by presenting data from a set of experiments we carried out with SE-the HSE patient previously reported by . Our studies were carried out independently of those of Laws et al., and were not designed as a response to their findings. However, our results led us to a different conclusion: We found that SE exhibited the typical pattern of a deficit for the visual properties of living things. Given this effect, we were then able to investigate whether the deficit was truly selective for living things or whether it extended to non-living things to any degree; that is, to try to separate the predictions of the distributed and localised accounts of category-specific deficits for living things. These findings are presented in the first section of the paper. In the subsequent section we discuss the apparent conflict between our results and those reported by Laws et al., before proceeding to a general discussion of the implications of our results for the distributed and localised accounts of category-specific deficits for living things.
CASE HISTORY
SEis a 65-year-old left-handed man, who worked as a railwayman since leaving school at the age of 14 until his illness. He was admitted to hospital in 1986 with a 3-day history of nausea, headaches, and disorientation. The provisional diagnosis was herpes simplex encephalitis. CT scans at that time showed low density areas in the right temporal lobe. MRI imaging was carried out in 1993 at Addenbrookes Hospital, Cambridge, using axial multiecho and three-d SPGR sequences with coronal reconstructions. The scan showed gross destruction of the right temporal pole, uncus, hippocampus, parahippocampal gyrus, inferior and lateral temporal gyri to the level of the insula with compensatory dilation of the temporal horn of the right lateral ventricle. There was no damage to the left hemisphere except for a small region of high signal on the T2 weighted sequence in the region of the uncus and amygdala 2 . SE was tested on a battery of standard neuropsychological tests, the results of which are reported in . In summary, he had well-preserved general intelligence, as measured by the WAIS, and his performance on tests of perception and memory was satisfactory. Performance on the Token Test and the Test for Reception of Grammar (TROG) was also good.
We confirmed that SE's comprehension of language was well preserved in two additional tests. He scored 64/70 on the Birkbeck reversible sentence comprehension test (Black, Nickels, & Byng, 1991) , which is well within the normal range (55-70). He also showed the normal pattern of sensitivity to both semantic anomalies and a range of syntactic violations in an on-line word-monitoring paradigm (Tyler, 1992) . Spontaneous speech was fluent, coherent, and well-articulated. Finally, we confirmed that SE did not have a problem with the perceptual processing of pictorial input, which might otherwise interact with picture recognition and naming. On the difficult version of the object decision task from the Birmingham Object Recognition Battery (Riddoch & Humphreys, 1993) he scored 26/32 (control range 22-30). He also performed at ceiling on the item match task and the minimal feature view task, which involves matching different views of the same object, when one view obscures the main identifying feature.
We carried out two initial experiments that confirmed that SE had a mild category-specific deficit for living things of the kind that is frequently reported in patients recovering from herpes simplex encephalitis. In the first test we asked SE to define a set of 24 living things and 24 non-living things from the Snodgrass and Vanderwart (1980) picture set. Living things included animals, birds, and insects as well as fruit, vegetables, and plants. The non-living things included tools, household objects, musical instruments, buildings, and vehicles. The living and non-living sets were matched according to rated familiarity of the words on a scale of 1 to 7, taken from the MRC database (Coltheart, 1981) supplemented by our own ratings collected at the Centre for Speech and Language (living items, mean = 4.98, SD = 0.81; non-living items, mean = 5.1, SD = 0.73) 3 . The living and non-living items were also matched for concreteness (living things, mean = 6.16, SD = 0.30; non-living things, mean = 6.22, SD = 0.37) and length in number of phonemes in Southern British English (living things, mean = 5.4, SD = 2.04; non-living things, mean = 4.5, SD = 1.9). The words for definition were read out by the experimenter, and SE was asked to define each one, imagining that he was explaining what the thing was to a person from another country or another world. No prompts were given by the experimenter, except for a general question "Anything else?" To provide an objective measure of the accuracy of SE's definitions, we later presented the transcribed definitions to a group of 10 control subjects from the Centre for Speech and Language subject panel, who were asked to rate how well the person giving the definition seemed to understand the word, on a scale of 1 (very poor) to 5 (very good).
The mean rating for SE's definitions of living things (3.42, SD = 0.77) was significantly worse than the mean rating for non-living things [4.0, SD = 0.51, F(1.46) = 9.3, P < 0.01]. Because of the advantage in familiarity of the non-living things, according to the Snodgrass and Vanderwart norms, we carried out a second analysis in which we compared a subset of 10 living things and 10 non-living things from the low to medium familiarity range, which were closely matched for object familiarity on an item-by-item basis. The mean familiarity for this set was 2.3 (SD = 0.71) for living things and 2.4 (SD = 0.63) for non-living things. The difference in ratings of definitions was still significant, with a mean of 3.2 (SD = 0.63) and 4.0 (SD = 0.56) for living and non-living 3 Alternative familiarity ratings are also available in Snodgrass and Vanderwart (1980) . The two sets differ in that the former refer to the familiarity of the word and the latter to the familiarity of the object itself. We used the MRC ratings as our main source because (a) these ratings were collected from British English rather than American subjects, and it is likely that there will be some variation across cultures, and (b) the experiments in this study use spoken rather than pictorial stimuli, and so word familiarity is more relevant. However, we checked subsequently and found that the non-living things were somewhat more familiar according to the Snodgrass and Vanderwart ratings [living things, mean = 2.71, SD = 0.86; non-living things, mean = 3.28, SD = 0.95; F(1,46) = 3.9, P < .05] and so we carried out post-hoc tests on the definition results to assess the effect of this difference (see following). things respectively; F(1,18) = 8.6, P < .01. Some examples of SE's definitions of these items are shown in Appendix 1.
A similar pattern was revealed in a picture naming experiment. We asked SE to name all 260 black-and-white line drawings in the Snodgrass and Vanderwart (1980) set. We also obtained data from 12 age-and educationmatched subjects (mean age 71 years, range 61-75: mean school leaving age 15 years, range 14-17). The control data by semantic category, shown in Table  1 , reveal naming accuracy ranging from 76% to 92% correct (mean 85%). Overall, control subjects had somewhat more difficulty in naming the pictures of the living things (mean = 82% correct, SD = 8, range 68-95%) than the non-living things (mean 91% correct, SD = 5, range 79-98%). SE's naming accuracy of 86%correct was within the normal range for the non-living things, but his performance was below the normal range for living things (63%), as shown in Table 1 4 . This gave rise to a highly significant living/non-living difference (c 2 = 16.9, P < .001) 5 . Moreover, SE's difference in accuracy between living and non-living things (23%) was greater than for any of the controls (1-18%). The majority of SE's naming errors for living things were "don't knows" but also included some category co-ordinate errors (fox-dog; ostrich-goose) and superordinates (fly-insect).
One drawback of the Snodgrass and Vanderwart picture set is that the familiarity of living and non-living things is not matched, with a higher proportion of low-familiarity items in the living than non-living categories, so it is possible that SE's naming deficit for living things is exaggerated by their lower familiarity. To check this, we examined SE's naming accuracy on the subsets of familiarity-matched items identified by Funnell and Sheridan (1992) . There was no significant category effect for any of the three frequency/familiarity bands, although numerically he made more errors on the living things in each set. However, these sets are small and may lack sufficient power to detect category effects. We have recently constructed a new set of 138 pictures (colour photographs) in which living and non-living things are closely matched for familiarity on an item-by-item basis (Bunn, Tyler, & Moss, submitted) . In this set, four categories of living things were closely matched to four categories of non-living things (animals and vehicles, mean familiarity 2.91 and 2.9 4 For both SEand control subjects, self-corrections have not been included in the total of correct responses. These account for less than 5% of the data in both cases.
5 Throughout this paper we use the term living things to include animals, birds, and insects as well as fruit and vegetables . We have excluded body parts from the living things category as they are strictly parts of living things and not living things in their own right. We have also excluded the plant items because they are superordinates (e.g. flower). SE's overall accuracy for living things is not affected if fruit and vegetables are removed to leave only animate items (62%correct, controls mean = 84%, SD = 7, range = 72-96).
respectively, mean visual complexity 3.36 and 3.2 respectively; fruit and household tools; familiarity 3.89 and 3.84, complexity 2.23 and 1.97; insects and toys, familiarity 2.45 and 2.49, complexity 3.13 and 2.82, and vegetables and clothes, familiarity 3.76 and 3.75, complexity 2.36 and 2.30). For these pictures, SE shows a significant advantag e for naming non-living things (84% correct) versus living things (64%; c 2 = 6.35, P < .02). The results of the definition generation and picture naming tasks show that SE has a mild category-specific impairment for living things, including both animal life and fruit and vegetables. This deficit is not entirely attributable to the generally lower familiarity of living things, since it remains significant when familiarity is tightly controlled on an item-by-item basis. 
EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION Semantic Priming
Our experimental investigation was designed to determine whether SE's mild semantic impairment for living things was accompanied by a special difficulty with the visual-perceptual properties of those items, as has been reported for similar cases in the literature, and if so, whether this difficulty was confined to the category of living things, or was a more general problem with visual semantic properties across all categories. We first tested SE's knowledge of visual properties and other kinds of semantic information for living and non-living things using a semantic priming task. In a semantic priming task, subjects are asked to make a fast reaction time response to a target word, and their response latencies are measured as a function of the preceding prime word. When targets are preceded by a semantically related word (e.g. cat-dog), responses are typically speeded up compared to when they are preceded by an unrelated word (e.g. pen-dog). By varying the nature of the semantic relationship between prime and target and assessing which of them support a significant priming effect, we can determine which kinds of semantic information remain intact in the underlying representation (Moss, Ostrin, Tyler, & Marslen-Wilson, 1995b ), as we have shown for patients with semantic deficits in a number of previous studies Tyler & Moss, in press ). This technique probes the nature of semantic knowledge in a different way to more explicit tasks, such as definition generation and property verification, because the relation between prime and target is implicit and because the speeded response minimises metalinguistic or strategic effects. Thus semantic priming provides an on-line measure of automatic access to underlying semantic representations that can complement other tasks that tap into controlled retrieval processes. In using the semantic priming task, it is important to address two related potential problems with this paradigm that have recently been highlighted. The first, pointed out by Rapp and Caramazza (1993) amongst others, is that only partial semantic information need be intact in order to support significant priming. This is certainly true, but does not undermine the use of the priming task in the current study, because we are not simply interpreting facilitation of a single target by a prime as evidence of an intact representation of that word. Rather we are looking at priming for a range of targets , related to the meaning of the prime in different ways, precisely in order to reveal partial preservation of different aspects of the prime's meaning-which will be shown by a pattern of significant facilitation for certain targets but not for others.
The second problem is the possibility of hyper-priming, as highlighted by Chertkow, Bub, and Seidenberg (1989) . Given that priming may be supported by partial information, we may actually find greater than normal priming effects-or hyper-priming. Although this will show up as a significant priming effect, it should not be counted as an instance of normal priming, but rather as an abnormal effect, indicative of degraded underlying semantic representations. The basis of hyper-priming is that if the subject has a degraded (but not fully lost) semantic representation of the target word, this will lead to a very long reaction time in the baseline condition-when the target is preceded by an unrelated word. When the target is preceded by the related prime, it will be facilitated by a disproportionate amount, because it has "more to gain." The mechanisms by which the contextual support from the prime have their facilitatory effect vary on different models of priming, but in all cases, a target that is difficult to recognise will show more priming. The possibility of hyper-priming is an important point, and it is therefore necessary to check for it in our priming data, as shown by reaction times in the baseline condition that are much longer than those of control subjects, and priming effects that are proportionately much larger. It is also important to note, however, that the design of our priming experiment is not subject to the dangers of hyper-priming to the same extent as a more simple experiment with a single prime-target relation. First, the concepts of interest (living and non-living things) are used as primes rather than targets in the crucial conditions, and the targets refer to properties of those primes (e.g. fox-red, fox-sly). Therefore any arguments about hyper-priming due to long baseline reaction times refer to the semantic representations of the property words (red and sly) rather than the primes (fox). We have no reason to suppose that SE has degraded representations of words referring to these semantic properties. However, to check on this possibility we carried out a post-test in which we asked SE to give a definition of each property word to ensure that he understood them. Secondly, any facilitation of these property targets must be based on quite specific aspects of meaning being activated when the prime is heard (e.g. that a fox is sly or that a fox is red). Priming for these word pairs could not plausibly be based on some very general partial knowledge of the prime word. Finally, in order to assess SE's susceptibility to hyperpriming we include two additional types of prime target relations-category co-ordinates (e.g. fox-dog) and superordinates (fox-animal). In these cases it is more plausible that SE could show abnormally long baseline RTs due to partial knowledge of the target word and that priming could be supported by some general partial knowledge shared by prime and target. If there is no sign of hyper-priming in these conditions, it is even more unlikely to be operating for the specific property conditions.
We used an on-line priming task for several reasons. First, SE's semantic impairment is clearly a mild one, compared to several other cases reported in the literature. Therefore, we may be more successful in detecting differential impairments for different kinds of semantic information in a task that allows us to measure reaction times of responses rather than error rates alone. Second, SE's performance in the priming task may enable us to determine whether any difficulty with visual properties is due to the loss of stored information or to a problem with the controlled retrieval of that information. Warrington and Shallice (1979) suggest a number of criteria for distinguishing these kinds of deficit, but these have all been challenged (Rapp & Caramazza, 1993) . We have argued elsewhere that on-line tasks such as semantic priming can help in disentangling problems of representation and access Tyler, 1992) . In some cases, information that cannot be retrieved voluntarily to support performance in explicit tasks can, nevertheless, support automatic priming, suggesting that brain damage has had the effect of disrupting controlled retrieval processes rather than causing the loss of stored information. SE's pattern of performance in the priming task will therefore be compared with his performance in an explicit off-line task to provide information about the nature of the semantic impairment.
The final reason for testing SE's knowledge of visual and non-visual properties of living and non-living things in an on-line priming task was to provide a possible basis for separating the localised account of semantic representation in which visual properties of living and non-living things are stored separately and so can be independently impaired, from De Renzi and Lucchelli's (1994) extension of the general account that would allow for an apparently selective problem for visual properties of living things, even when there had been general damage to visual properties across the board. They suggested that there may be stronger bonds between functional and visual properties for non-living things than living things, such that any loss of knowledge of visual properties could be compensated for by inferences and cross-references from the intact non-visual properties. If this is the case, it is plausible that these inferences and cross-references take a certain amount of time and effort to operate on the part of the subject. Therefore, although they may support good performance for visual properties of non-living objects in off-line tasks such as property verification, where there is unlimited time and considerable incentive for them to do so, this may not be the case in an implicit priming task. In a priming experiment we might expect any loss of knowledge of visual properties of non-living objects to be revealed. This is because subjects are not necessarily aware of the fact that inferences from functional properties to visual properties may facilitate performance on the task and also because the time for such inferences to be drawn is limited by the need for a speeded response. Thus, the priming paradigm may expose the underlying gaps in the representations of objects that are the result of general damage to visual properties, but which can be compensated for by function-form inferences in off-line tasks. If this is the case, we would expect to see a lack of facilitation of visual properties of both living things and non-living objects in the priming task. On the other hand, the localised account would predict that the results of the priming task will be no different to those of the off-line experiments because both are the result of selective loss of visual properties of living things; i.e. a dissociation between intact priming for visual properties of non-living objects and an absence of priming for visual properties of living things.
Materials and Design
In this experiment we contrasted priming for visual and non-visual properties for a set of 24 living and 24 non-living prime words. The primes were the same words as used in the definition generation task (see Appendix 1) and were matched on a number of variables including word familiarity, as described earlier. The visual and non-visual properties for each prime word were selected according to the results of a property generation pre-test. We initially entered 120 items from the Snodgrass and Vanderwart set (52 living and 68 non-living) into the pre-test. The items were divided into 2 lists of 60, each presented to 45 members of the Centre for Speech and Language subject panel. Instructions were based on those used by Ashcraft (1978) , emphasising that subjects should list the properties that "most people would generally attribute to the object or thing." Results of the pre-tests were compiled and a production frequency for each property of each stimulus word calculated. This refers to the percentage of subjects who list a given property for a given word, and can be taken as an approximate guide to the centrality or dominance of that property (cf. Ashcraft, 1978) . In selecting visual and non-visual properties for the experiment, we attempted to use properties with a high production frequency, and to match the production frequency of the properties across the four conditions (living-visual, living-non-visual, non-living-visual, non-living-non-visual) . In the final set (see Table 2 ) it was unavoidable that the mean production frequency for the visual properties of living things was somewhat higher than in the other property conditions. However, if anything this should increase the priming in this condition, and so works against our hypothesis that SE has particular problems with visual properties of living things. Correlation analyses will also be carried out to check for any effect of this variable.
On the basis of the property generation pre-test, we selected the 24 living and 24 non-living prime words, each of which had a suitable visual and non-visual property. All the properties were expressible in one word that could be used as a target for lexical decision. So, for example, visual property items included fox-red, squirrel-tail, fridge-white, and desk-wood, and the non-visual property items included fox-sly, squirrel-tree, fridge-cold, and desk-office. The second constraint was that the prime-target pairs should not be strong lexical associates, according to association norms 6 . All prime-target pairs in the property conditions had an association strength of less than 15%in forward and backward direction (Moss & Older, 1996; Postman & Keppel, 1970) . Property targets in each condition were also matched for word familiarity (Coltheart, 1981) , and as closely as possible for written word frequency (Hofland & Johanssen, 1982) . It was not possible to achieve a close match on this final variable, but this was considered to be less important than rated familiarity, since materials were presented in the auditory rather than written modality.
Category Co-ordinates and Superordinates. We compared priming in the visual and non-visual property conditions with two other kinds of prime-target relation. This was partly to assess any possible hyper-priming effects for SE and also to compare the magnitude of priming effects for specific properties of primes with those for words sharing a greater degree of semantic overlap. The first was a superordinate condition (e.g. fox-animal, desk-furniture). Most accounts of semantic impairment claim that any loss of information will affect specific semantic properties of a concept before affecting more general information about superordinate category (e.g. Shallice, 1988b; Warrington, 1975 ; although see Funnell, 1995; Moss, Tyler, & Kopelman, submitted, for counterarguments) . Therefore, we would expect to see priming in this condition, whether or not property priming is also present. Finally we included a category co-ordinate condition (e.g. fox-dog, desk-cabinet). Close co-ordinates of this kind share a great deal of semantic information, and we would also expect these to prime, regardless of specific property priming. Many studies of priming with normal subjects have demonstrated robust priming effects for category co-ordinates of this kind (e.g. Moss et al., 1995b ). Therefore we can use the category co-ordinate condition as an index of the sensitivity of the experiment to detect priming effects.
For the category co-ordinate condition, a target was picked that was a similar member of the same superordinate category as the prime (e.g. fox-dog, desk-cabinet). Familiarity and length of co-ordinate targets were matched as closely as possible over the living and non-living conditions. Association strength between prime and target was kept below 5%. The target in the superordinate condition was the name of the superordinate category, which was obvious in most cases (e.g. fox-animal, desk-furniture). In the case of musical instruments, the superordinate target was shortened to instrument. In the superordinate conditions, it was more difficult to avoid associative relations between prime and target, because there was only one possible target for each item. However, items with very strong associative links to the superordinate were avoided, such that the maximum associative strength for any prime-target pair was 18%.
Semantic Relatedness Pre-test. An additional pre-test was carried out to establish the strength of the semantic relation between the primes and targets in the property conditions and in the category co-ordinate conditions. In total, 144 prime-target pairs were tested, rotated over three different lists to avoid repetition of prime words. In each list, the test items were interspersed with filler items that were either close synonyms or semantically unrelated. Each list was presented to 15 members of the Centre for Speech and Language subject panel, who rated each word pair on a scale of 1 (very unrelated in meaning) to 9 (very related in meaning). The mean rating for synonyms was 8.06, and for unrelated pairs it was 1.7, indicating that subjects were using the rating scale correctly. The mean rating for co-ordinate pairs was 6.09 for non-living things and 5.95 for living things. The mean ratings for visual properties were 4.95 for non-living things and 4.81 for living things. The mean ratings for non-visual properties were 5.61 for non-living things and 5.28 for living things. As we would expect, the co-ordinate pairs are judged to be more highly related than the prime-property pairs. Also the non-visual properties are judged to be somewhat more related to their primes than are the visual properties. But the important point is that for each type of target, the strength of semantic relation is very similar for the living and non-living sets.
The final list of test stimuli consists of 24 living thing primes and 24 non-living thing primes, each paired with 4 different kinds of target: a superordinate, a category co-ordinate, a visual property, and a non-visual property (e.g.
fox-animal, fox-dog, fox-red, fox-sly).
For each target type, the items in the living and non-living conditions were closely matched on familiarity, length, association strength, semantic relatedness, and, in the case of property targets, production frequency. See Table 2 for full details of all stimuli.
Control Words. In the related conditions of the priming experiment, the prime was presented, followed by one of its four targets . Reaction times in these related conditions were compared with responses to the same targets preceded by an unrelated control word. The control word was matched to the prime in familiarity and length, but was unrelated to any of the target words. The control word came from the same broad semantic domain as the prime word (i.e. living or non-living) but from a different specific category (e.g. the control prime for rabbit was daisy, the control prime for hammer was mattress).
Rotation. For each prime-target type, the related and unrelated pairs were rotated over two different versions of the materials, so that the same item was not repeated. Half of the targets were presented with the related prime in Version 1 and with the unrelated prime in Version 2. For the other half the order was reversed. This rotation was carried out separately for each of the four target types. However, it was not possible to test each version for each target type separately, because this would involve eight different testing sessions, and also, the inclusion of only one type of prime-target relation in the test list may increase the likelihood of strategic rather than automatic priming effects (Becker, 1980) . Therefore we combined the versions in the following way to give four blocks. Version 1 visual properties were combined with Version 2 co-ordinate properties, and Version 2 visual properties were combined with Version 1 co-ordinate properties. Likewise, Version 1 non-visual properties were combined with Version 2 superordinate properties and Version 2 non-visual properties were combined with Version 2 superordinate properties. In each case, the trials of each target type were interspersed. This reduced the number of testing blocks to four. Because of the combinations of opposing versions, each prime was still only encountered once in a test block 7 .
Filler Trials. In each test block there were 48 related word pairs and 48 unrelated control pairs. For each block, we added 48 unrelated word filler pairs, Hofland and Johanssen (1982) . 7 Although prime repetition was avoided within a test block, there was some repetition of targets. This was especially the case in the superordinate condition, where all eight animals inevitably had to be paired with the same target, animal, all four birds with the target bird, and so on. These repeated targets were distributed as evenly as possible throughout the test lists. In the property target conditions there were occasional repeats, where the same property target was used for two different primes (e.g. fox-red and strawberry-red). These repeated targets were placed as far apart in the test list as possible.
to reduce the proportion of semantically related real word pairs to 33%. This reduces the opportunity for strategic, rather than automatic, priming effects (Neely, 1991) 8 . Finally, 144 word-nonword pairs (e.g. morning-hiction, tulip-blane) were added so that the correct lexical decision response would be YES on 50% of trials and NO on the other 50% of trials. Nonwords were all phonologically acceptable strings, made by changing one or two phonemes of a real word. The order of test, filler, and nonword trials was pseudorandomised, to ensure even distribution of items of each type throughout the list. Different sets of word and nonword filler items were used in the two visual and co-ordinate test blocks and in the two superordinate and non-visual test blocks. In each case filler "primes" and targets were matched in length to the test items.
A set of 41 practice items was made (21 word-word pairs and 20 word-nonword pairs). This was played before each test block. Thirty percent of the practice items were semantically related in some way, to mimic the relatedness proportions of the test list. However, we did not include relations of the same kinds as in the test list, so as not to alert subjects to the nature of the relation under study. Finally there were two dummy items at the beginning of each test block, and at a point halfway through the test block, so that a midway break could be introduced where necessary.
Procedure
The paradigm we used was auditory-auditory priming of lexical decision with a 200msec inter-stimulus interval between prime and target. All items were recorded onto DAT tape by a female native speaker of Southern British English in a sound-attenuated booth. The words were then digitised at a sampling rate of 20kHz, and their acoustic onsets and offsets marked using a speech editing system. During the experiment, the words were played out from computer disk under the control of the DMASTR experimental package. The prime word was played out over headphones: 200msec after the acoustic offset of the prime, the target word was played out. A timer started at the onset of the target word, which was stopped when the subject made a lexical decision by pressing the button marked YES or NO on a button box in front of them. Response latencies were recorded to computer disk. There was an inter-trial interval of 3 sec between each pair of words. If no lexical decision response was made within 2 sec, this was counted as a time-out. 8 A relatedness proportion of 33% of real words is probably not low enough to eradicate the possibility of strategic priming effects completely. However, it was not possible to add any more unrelated filler items without making the experiment impracticably long for patients. As a check on the effect of relatedness proportion on the magnitude and pattern of priming effects, we have compared a 10%and 33%relatedness proportion for the same set of materials for a group of young normal subjects, and found no difference in the pattern of priming effects. SE. SE completed all four test blocks. Two of the blocks were administered in the first testing session, but with several unrelated tasks intervening. The other two blocks were administered in a second test session 4 weeks later, again separated by unrelated tests. To minimise repetition effects, the two blocks administered on the same day contained the two different combinations of target types (i.e. one included the superordinate and non-visual property targets and the other included the co-ordinate and visual property targets ). Several weeks after completing the priming study we asked SE to give definitions of all the words used in the property conditions in order to ensure that he understood them, reducing the likelihood that degraded semantic representations of the property concepts could provide a basis for hyper-priming.
Results
Control Subjects. Initial inspection of the data indicated that four items in the experiment (two living; rhinoceros and swan, and two non-living; fridge and flute) were not giving rise to reliable priming effects in any of the conditions, and so these were removed from the set before any analyses were carried out. All analyses reported here were carried out on the remaining 44 primes. Data for each of the four semantic relation types (superordinate, co-ordinate, visual property, and non-visual property) were cleaned separately and entered into four sets of analysis of variance (ANOVAs). For each set of ANOVAs there were three variables: Version (1/2) × Category (Living/Nonliving) × Prime Type (Related/Unrelated). Results are shown in Fig. 1 and Table 3 9 .
(a) a testing session) were replaced by the cut-off value (4.7%). Means were calculated over the remaining data and entered into ANOVAs with subjects and items as random factors. Results from these ANOVAs were combined to compute the MinF¢ statistic (Clark, 1973) . Reaction times in the related condition (677msec, SD = 79) were significantly faster than in the unrelated condition [716msec, SD = 88; MinF¢ (1,8) = 8.9, P < .05]. There was no interaction between priming effect and living/non-living category [F1 (1,5) = 7, P < .05; F2(1,40) = 1.9, P > .17].
2. Category co-ordinates: The mean overall reaction time was 743msec (SD = 81; range: 592-825msec). Data points that corresponded to lexical decision errors (1.1%) or time-outs (0%) were removed and not replaced. Data points that fell outside 2SD of the mean reaction time were replaced by the cut-off value (4%). Reaction times in the related condition (708msec, SD = 68) were significantly faster than in the unrelated condition [777msec, SD = 80; MinF¢ (1,44) = 54.3, P < .001] and there was no interaction between priming effect and living/non-living category (F1 and F2 < 1).
3. Non-visual properties: The mean overall reaction time was 757msec (SD = 112; range: 626-837msec). Data points that corresponded to lexical decision errors (1.9%) or time-outs (0.2%) were removed and not replaced. Data points Rel. = Related prime; Unrel. = Unrelated prime; Diff(U-R) = the difference between related and unrelated primes; % = The difference score, Diff(U-R), expressed as a percentage of the reaction time in the unrelated baseline condition.
----------------------------------
that fell outside 2SD from the mean reaction time were replaced by the cut-off value (5.2%). Reaction times in the related condition (730msec, SD = 107) were significantly faster than in the unrelated condition [787msec, SD = 111; MinF¢ (1,17) = 16, P < .01]. There was no interaction between priming effect and living/non-living category (F1 and F2 < 1).
4. Visual properties: The mean overall reaction time was 779msec (SD = 97; range: 606-861msec). Data points that corresponded to lexical decision errors (1.9%) or time-outs (0%) were removed and not replaced. Data points that fell outside 2SD from the mean reaction were replaced by the cut-off value (4.6%). Reaction times in the related condition (742msec, SD = 98) were significantly faster than in the unrelated condition [779msec, SD = 93; MinF¢ (1,15) = 9.6, P < .01], with no interaction between priming effect and living/non-living category (F1 and F2 < 1).
In summary, the control group showed robust priming for all kinds of semantically related target, with no difference between the living and nonliving categories. We did not analyse error data, because the number of lexical decision errors was very low across all conditions, and generally followed the pattern shown by the reaction time results (i.e. fewer errors in the related than the unrelated prime conditions).
SE-Property Definition Test. SE was able to
give an adequate definition of all the property words used in the priming experiment. Although these definitions were not subjected to quantitative analysis, some examples from the visual property condition are given in Appendix 3 to illustrate SE's accurate responses.
Data for the four items identified as problematic for control subjects were excluded from the analysis. As for the control group, data for each type of semantic relation were analysed separately (see Fig. 1 and Table 3 ). Because SE's reaction times were slightly longer than those of control subjects in some conditions, Table 3 shows priming effects reported as a percentage of control baselines as well as absolute values.
1. Superordinates: SE's mean reaction time was 748msec (SD = 158). He made no lexical decision errors. Inspection of the distribution of reaction times showed that two data points (2.3%) were extremely long outliers, and these were removed and not replaced. Data points that fell outside 2SD of the mean reaction time (by testing session) were replaced with the cut-off point (4.8%). Means were then calculated and entered into by-items ANOVAs, with the variables Version(1/2) × Category Type (Living/Non-living) and Prime Type (Related/Unrelated). SE showed a significant priming effect for superordinates, with reaction times in the related condition (696msec, SD = 153) faster than in the unrelated condition [785msec, SD = 151; F(1,38) = 10.1, P < .01]. There was no interaction between priming effect for living/non-living category (F < 1).
2. Co-ordinates: SE's mean reaction time was 885msec (SD = 189). He made one lexical decision error and a further four data points (4.5%) were identified as outlier values-these were removed and not replaced. Data points that fell outside 2SD of the mean reaction were removed and replaced with the cut-off point (5.1%). SE showed a significant priming effect for category co-ordinates, with reaction times in the related condition (831msec, SD = 204) faster than in the unrelated condition [933msec, SD = 160; F(1,35) = 6.5, P < .05]. There was no difference in the priming effect for living and non-living categories (F < 1).
3. Non-visual properties: SE's mean reaction time was 836msec (SD = 171). He made two (2.3%) lexical decision errors, and three further data points (3.4%) were removed as outliers. We replaced 5.7% of data points that fell outside 2SDof the mean with the cut-off value. SEshowed a significant priming effect for non-visual properties, with reaction times in the related condition (792msec, SD = 187) significantly faster than in the unrelated condition [876msec, SD = 143; F(1,35) = 8.6, P < .01], with no difference between the priming effects for the living and non-living categories (F < 1).
4. Visual properties: SE's mean reaction time was 910msec (SD = 192). One lexical decision error, one time-out, and three long outliers (3.4%) were removed and not replaced. We replaced 5.1% of data points that fell outside 2SD of the mean with the cut-off value. SE's reaction times in the related condition (881msec, SD = 192) were faster than in the unrelated condition (935msec, SD = 193). However, this did not give rise to a significant overall priming effect [F(1,35) = 2.1, P > .1]. Unlike all of the other conditions reported so far, there was a marked difference between the priming effect for the non-living things (121msec) and the priming effect (or lack of priming effect) for the living things (-9msec). This difference is reflected in a marginally significant interaction between prime type and category type [F(1,35) = 2.9, P = .096]. Separate ANOVAs confirmed that whereas there was a significant priming effect for the visual properties of non-living things [F(1,17) = 5.4, P < .05], there was no effect for living things (F < 1) 10 .
In summary, SE's reaction times were significantly facilitated by the related prime in the superordinate, co-ordinate, and non-visual conditions, with no difference in priming effect for living and non-living things. Although the 10 Because there were some repeated targets in the visual property condition, we checked that repetition did not interact with priming. There was no effect of repetition. For living things there was a mean of -18 and -138msec priming for targets presented in first and second position, and for non-living things the effects were 191 and 142msec respectively . separate analyses of priming for living and non-living things did not always reach significance, this can be attributed to the lack of power in the analysis of data for an individual subject; the size of the priming effect in msec was within or above the normal range in all cases. However, SE diverges from the normal pattern when the target is a visual property of the prime. Here we find significant priming in the non-living category (e.g. desk-wood) but no priming in the living category (e.g. fox-red). The difference of -9msec between the related and unrelated prime in the living visual condition stands out sharply from the facilitation shown in all other conditions by both SE and control subjects. No control subject showed this pattern. In the control group the range of priming effects in the living visual property condition was 24msec-67msec. The subject who showed the smallest priming effect in this condition (24msec) showed a similarly small effect of 40msec in the non-living visual property condition. Unlike SE, there was no interaction between category type and priming. There was no evidence that SE was showing hyper-priming. His reaction times were within the normal range or only slightly longer (60msec and 49msec longer than those of the slowest control subject in the co-ordinate and visual property conditions respectively). Thus he does not show the kinds of extremely long reaction times that Chertkow, Bub, and Seidenberg (1989) reported to be indicative of hyper-priming.
Because the primes in the living things set were slightly less familiar than in the non-living things set, according to the Snodgrass and Vanderwart norms of object familiarity rather than word familiarity, we examined the priming effects for visual properties for a subset of 10 living and non-living things that were matched for object familiarity on an item-by-item basis (see definition task earlier). The priming effects mirrored the overall pattern, with 117msec facilitation for non-living things, but only 26msec for living things. Although the priming effect for non-living things does not reach significance here, due to the small number of items [F(1,9) = 2.97, P > .1], it is numerically much larger than that for the living things (F < 1).
Another possible confound that could explain the difference in priming for visual properties of living and non-living things is a difference in the nature of the visual properties probed in each case 11 . We selected visual properties that were listed by subjects in the property verification pre-test and which fitted the various constraints in terms of matching target words across conditions. We did not, however, match the precise nature of visual properties used for living and non-living things with respect to whether they referred to the colour or shape of the object, to its visible parts, or to some other aspect. It is possible that SE may be impaired to different extents on certain subtypes of visual property (e.g. colours). This could account for the priming data, if the impaired 11 We are grateful to one of the anonymous reviewers for pointing out this possibility. subtype happened to be over-represented in the living things condition. An examination of the materials revealed that there are indeed differences in the distribution of types of visual property across the living and non-living conditions, with more colours and shapes for the living things than non-living things, whereas only non-living things include substance properties (e.g. wood, brass, etc). However, in both cases, the majority of properties refer to visible parts of the prime object (10 and 14 for living and non-living respectively). If we compare priming for "part" properties only, we find the same pattern as for the overall analysis earlier: There is a highly significant priming effect for non-living things [195msec, SD 121; F(1,13) = 34, P < .001] but no priming for living things [65msec, SD323; F < 1]. It is interesting to note, however, that SE does seem to show slightly better priming for parts than for the other types of visual property, such as colour shape and substance. However, these are equally poor for living things (mean priming effect for the eight colour items for living things = 32msec) and non-living things (mean priming effect for the six substance items for non-living things = -114msec). Therefore, although there may be some overall differences in the degree of impairment for different types of visual properties, we still see the contrast between intact priming for non-living things and the lack of priming for living things when we hold type of visual property constant by including only the "part" properties. This is particularly striking, given that some of the "part" targets are identical for living and non-living things (e.g. onion-skin, drum-skin; bee-wings, aeroplane-wings) . Discussion SE's lack of priming for visual properties of living things contrasts with the large priming effects he shows in all the other conditions, suggesting that this is a real difference from the normal pattern. This pattern of results provides clear answers to the two questions addressed by the priming study. First, the deficit for visual properties of living things appears to be selective. This appears to be more consistent with an impairment that affects a separate store of visual semantic information for living things, leaving visual semantic information for non-living things intact, rather than a general impairment for visual information regardless of category. It seems unlikely that a deficit for visual properties of non-living things could be compensated for by inferences from non-visual semantic information in the priming experiment, if we assume that such inferences require time and explicit motivation to take place.
Second, the fact that visual properties of living things did not support automatic priming indicates that the nature of the impairment for this type of information is one of loss of underlying information, rather than one of difficulty with controlled access only. However, in order to be confident of this interpretation, we need to determine whether SE shows the same pattern of selective impairment in a task that involves controlled rather than implicit access processes; otherwise the possibility remains that SE has difficulty specifically with the rapid automatic access of visual properties of living things required to support priming, rather than damage to underlying representations. If this is the case, then SE may not show the same selective impairment in an off-line task that relies on explicit retrieval of information rather than automatic access. In order to check on this possibility, and to provide further evidence about the nature of SE's difficulty with the visual properties of living things, we carried out an off-line property verification task, of the type that has frequently been employed in earlier studies of category-specific deficits.
Property Verification
We used a property verification task to probe controlled access to visual and non-visual attributes of living and non-living things. SE was presented with a spoken word, and asked whether a semantic property of that word's referent was true or false. The stimulus word came from either a living thing category or a non-living thing category, and the property was either a visual or a non-visual (functional/associative) property of the stimulus word. To provide a more detailed test we also manipulated the distinctiveness of the semantic properties of each type. In one set of conditions the properties were general to all (or almost all) members of the superordinate category. For example, Eagles have wings is a general property because all birds have wings. In the other set, the properties were distinctive of the item in question. For example, Tigers have stripes is a distinctive property because only a few animals have stripes. We included this variable because it may be an important determinant of the ease of property verification in the face of semantic impairment (Sartori & Job, 1988; Sartori et al., 1993a) . General property statements could be confirmed on the basis of less complete semantic information than is necessary to make the same decision about a distinctive property. Theoretically, one would need only to have access to superordinate information (e.g. that an eagle is a type of bird) to confirm that it has wings. But knowing that a tiger is an animal would not be enough to decide that it has stripes; a more detailed semantic representation is required.
Materials and Design
There were 16 property conditions (Distinctive/General × Living/Nonliving × Visual/Non-visual × True/False). In the case of the distinctive properties, a true statement was first created for an item, and then the property was paired with a similar member of the same category, which did not have that distinctive property. For example, the property is used to boil water is a true distinctive property of the word kettle 12 , and a false distinctive property of the word, teapot. The contrasts between true and false properties were deliberately designed to require fine-grained distinctions among very close category coordinates, to ensure that a correct answer could only be derived from rich, detailed, semantic representations. There were 22 items in each of the 8 distinctive property conditions. For both living and non-living things, the same items were used in the visual and non-visual property conditions where possible, so that familiarity was held constant. However, in a few cases it was not possible to generate suitable properties for the same items and so they were alternated with different items of a similar familiarity level. The mean familiarity rating for living things was 4.9 in the visual property condition and 5.1 in the non-visual property condition. For non-living things, the means were 5.4 and 5.3 respectively 13 . General property trials were then generated. Initially we attempted to pair each of the items from the distinctive property set with a general property. However, interesting differences in the structure of living and non-living semantic categories are suggested by the fact that it was possible to come up with very few general properties for the non-living categories. Because of the shortage of suitable properties, we were able to use only a subset of the items in some of the general conditions, although we repeated some properties to increase the numbers. The final set included 10 items in the general visual non-living condition and 19 items in the general visual living condition. The two non-visual general conditions contained 22 items (mean familiarity: living visual, 4.9; living non-visual, 5.1; non-living visual, 5.4; non-living non-visual, 5.3). As in the case of the distinctive properties, false trials were created by re-pairing each property with another item. For general properties, this was not a close category co-ordinate, but a member of a different semantic category (e.g. the general property of bicycle-is used for transport-was paired with the item cabbage to give the false trial cabbage-is used for transport).
Procedure
For all conditions each property appeared in one true and one false trial. These were counterbalanced over two versions of the materials. Trials were presented in pseudorandom order within each version. The experimenter read 12 We are not claiming that all the distinctive properties in this test are true of no other category members than the one of interest. For example, saucepans are also used to boil water. There are very few absolutely distinctive properties that apply to one item only. The point is that the property should be relatively specific, in comparison to general properties. 13 These figures are based on the MRC database ratings of word familiarity only, because many of the items were not included in the Snodgrass and Vanderwart picture set, and so ratings of object familiarity are not available.
out the item of interest, and then the property in question form (e.g. Kettle. Is it used to boil water? Hen. Does it live on rivers and lakes?) Subjects were instructed to respond YES or NO to each question. SE completed both versions within a single testing session, separated by several other unrelated tests. Nine control subjects also completed both versions within a testing session (mean age 72 years; range 67-79 years).
Results

Control Data.
Results for the control group are shown in Table 4 . Results for true and false trials in each condition are combined to give an overall measure of response accuracy, A¢ (where a score of 1 reflects error-free performance). Overall accuracy ranged from 90-97%. General properties proved to be slightly easier to verify (mean = 97% correct) than distinctive properties (mean = 93%correct), although this difference did not reach significance (c 2 = 1.2, P > .1).
SE.
Overall SE made a similar number of errors on true (11.8%) and false (9.3%) trials. His accuracy was below the normal range for the distinctive and general visual properties of living things (A¢ = .84 and .93 respectively), as can be seen in Table 4 . It was also just below the normal range for the general non-visual properties of living things (A¢ = .95). In contrast, SE had no difficulty with the visual properties of non-living things, with an A¢ of .96 in the distinctive condition and .98 in the general condition. Both these scores were within the normal range. A comparison of SE's accuracy for visual properties of living vs. non-living things shows that he was significantly worse for living things (c 2 = 4.29, P < .05). This effect was particularly marked for the distinctive properties (c 2 = 4.16, P < .05) but did not reach significance for the general properties alone, although the difference was in the same direction (c 2 < 1). It is important to note that SE's specific difficulty with the distinctive visual properties of living things was different to the normal pattern, and does not simply reflect something inherently more difficult about these properties. No control subject showed a significant difference in accuracy for the distinctive visual properties of living and non-living things.
We subsequently checked to ensure that SE's poor performance for the visual properties of living things could not be attributed to his not knowing some of the words used to describe these properties, rather than to his not knowing whether the properties were true of the target item. We asked SE to define all of the content words that we had used to ask the questions in the property verification task. If SE is able to define the words from the living/visual property conditions as well as those in other conditions, then a failure to understand the meanings of the properties themselves cannot be the basis of his apparent deficit for visual properties of living things.
SE was able to give good definitions of almost all of the words. Only four words were vaguely or incorrectly defined, and all of these were from the living things conditions. When we checked the results of the property verification task we found that all four of these words were responsible for an error. This close correspondence between the words that were not satisfactorily defined and the occurrence of errors for these items in the property verification test suggests that the cause of those errors may indeed have been lack of knowledge of the property words as much as lack of knowledge of the living thing we were asking about. However, only two of the incorrectly defined words were in the crucial distinctive visual property of living things condition. When all trials involving these words were removed, SE's score in this condition was still below the normal range (A¢ = .86) and it was still worse than his performance in the distinctive visual property of non-living things condition (c 2 = 3.02, .5 > P < .1).
Finally, we addressed the issue of whether SE's performance could be explained by differential impairment on different subtypes of visual semantic property, as discussed for the priming experiment. In the property verification experiment, there was a clear difference in the visual properties used for living and non-living things, with the distinctive visual properties made up mainly of colours with only a few part properties, whereas most of the distinctive visual properties of non-living things were visible parts. However, SE's errors on the distinctive visual properties of living things included parts (e.g. seal: does it have large claws? pig: does it have a curly tail?) as well as colours (e.g. potato: is it brown?). Therefore this cannot be the complete explanation of the difference in accuracy between the distinctive visual properties of living and nonliving things.
In summary, SE's performance on this task mirrors that in the priming study, with a specific deficit for the visual properties of living things. His difficulty is more marked for the distinctive properties of living things that cannot be inferred from general knowledge of the superordinate category, suggesting that SE was able to use some residual knowledge about items in living thing categories to support his responses for general visual properties of living things. The similarity of the results in the priming task and the property verification task indicates that SE is not able to access visual semantic information about living things, either automatically or under voluntary control, which is more consistent with loss or degradation of this information from the underlying representations than with an impairment to the processes involved in accessing those representations. The converging evidence from the two tasks also confirms the reliability of the pattern of results 14 .
Definition Generation
As described earlier, we initially asked SE to define a set of words referring to 24 living and 24 non-living things, in order to evaluate whether he had a category-specific deficit. The ratings from the control group indicated that he was significantly poorer at defining living things than non-living things. We also carried out a more detailed analysis of the contents of those definitions, to determine whether there is any additional support for the view that SE has a selective deficit for visual properties of living things. This analysis was carried out only for the subset of 10 living and 10 non-living things that were closely matched for familiarity, as detailed earlier. We counted how many correct properties SE gave for each word, and divided them into either visual or non-visual. In the non-visual category we included only those properties that are generally referred to as functional/associative. Properties referring to sensory modalities other than vision (e.g. sounds) were excluded from the analysis. We compared SE's total for each type of property with the totals for a group of six age-matched control subjects (mean age 65 years, SD = 3.06).
14 This is important given that it was not practical to repeat the same tests in order to assess consistency. This is because SE was repeatedly exposed to the same set of items in the various tests described here (naming, definitions, priming, and property verification). After these tests he became aware that he was having difficulty with certain items and spent considerable effort trying to improve his knowledge of them. Thus re-testing would have been confounded with learning and repetition effects.
As can be seen from Fig. 2 , SE's totals were within the normal range for non-living things, both for visual properties (mean 14: control range 11-32) and non-visual properties (mean 41; control range 25-69). The pattern was different for living things. Although he gave the same number of non-visual properties as the control subjects (mean 36; control range 27-62), he gave far fewer visual properties, and was well outside the normal range (mean 12; control range 28-78).
In addition to the correct responses, SE also produced a very few incorrect properties on this subset of items. Three were non-visual properties (a caterpillar is a type of slug; a swan is an amphibian; an ostrich lives in forestry areas) and two were visual (a caterpillar has no legs; an ostrich has multicoloured wings). Control subjects also made some non-visual errors (e.g. an ostrich is an animal like a bird; an ostrich lives in Australia; caterpillar-"I think it turns into a butterfly, or was it a butterfly before it became a caterpillar, I really don't know"; a swan can't fly), but there was only one questionable visual property error (a male fox has a white brush).
In summary, the definition task provides further evidence for the claim that SE has specific difficulty with the visual properties of living things, generating fewer of them than any control subject, although his responses in all other conditions are well within the normal range.
Drawing from Memory
As a final test of SE's knowledge of visual properties of living and non-living things, we asked him to produce line drawings of a set of 104 items, half living and half non-living. SE attempted to draw all of them with two exceptions (pumpkin and seahorse). Although it is difficult to present any formal analysis of picture drawing accuracy, due to the different degree of difficulty involved in drawing different objects, and individual variations in drawing skill, this task confirms the results of the previous three experiments, again revealing impairments in SE's knowledge of visual properties of living things, as can be seen in Fig. 3 . Although some of the more familiar fruit and vegetables and animals were drawn with the appropriate overall shape and parts, many were drawn with inappropriate parts (e.g. birds with four legs, a frog with many long legs, a crocodile with five legs), incorrect shapes (e.g. a heart-shaped lemon and pineapple, a long, segmented ant), missing or incorrect distinctive properties (e.g. a zebra with dapples rather than stripes, a tiger without stripes, a camel without a hump) and other unusual features (e.g. a dog and a penguin with human-like faces). In contrast, non-living things were generally drawn accurately, even those of low familiarity (e.g. windmill, yacht, cannon, axe) or high complexity (e.g. helicopter, bicycle, piano). Only one non-living thing was obviously incorrect (a syringe drawn as a funnel).
DISCUSSION OF LAWS ET AL. (1995)
In all of the four tasks we have reported, SE showed a consistent deficit for the visual properties of living things, which did not appear to be accompanied by a noticeable deficit for visual properties of non-living things. Before proceeding to a discussion of the implications of these results for the distributed and localised models of semantic memory outlined in the Introduction, we must first address the discrepancy between our data and that of . In clear contrast to our findings, Laws et al. concluded that SE's problem lay with non-visual or associative properties of living things rather than with their visual properties. What is the basis for this discrepancy?
Knowledge of Animal Life vs. Fruit and Vegetables?
One immediately apparent difference between the two studies is that the living things tested by Laws et al. included only animal life, whereas we also included fruits and vegetables. It is possible that SE shows a different pattern for fruit and vegetables than for animals, and that this is the basis for the difference in results. However, this is not the case. In our study, SE's data for the subset of animate items was always very similar to that for the living thing set as whole; e.g. in the naming task, SE's accuracy was 63% for animal life and 62% for living things as a whole. Also, the familiarity-matched subset of items that we analysed in both the priming tasks and the definition task contained only animal life in the living things set. These analyses revealed the same pattern of impairment for visual properties of living things as did the analyses of the wider set that included fruit and vegetables. Therefore we have no reason to believe that SE's performances varied systematically across animal life and fruit and vegetables within the domain of living things.
Associative Knowledge: Impaired or Intact?
Laws et al.'s central claim is that SE has difficulty with associative knowledge about living things, and they suggest that this kind of knowledge may depend on constructive processes in semantic memory, rather than being stored in a passive form to be accessed in a look-up process. The hypothesis that such semantic properties may be constructed rather than accessed via a look-up process is an interesting one, and we agree with many of the points raised. Moreover, the finding that SE has some difficulty with non-visual associative information about living things is not in itself inconsistent with our claim that his major deficit is for the visual properties of these concepts. In a distributed semantic memory system, loss of properties of one kind (e.g. visual) will have an effect on other properties (e.g. associative/functional) because overall activation levels for affected semantic representations will be lowered. This was demonstrated in Farah and McClelland's (1991) connectionist simulation, where selective lesions of a proportion of the perceptual properties of living things resulted in a mild but detectable accompanying reduction of activation for functional properties. This is consistent with the fact that most patients reported with problems for visual properties of living things also have some degree of impairment for associative properties. Therefore we are not necessarily claiming that SE has no impairment at all for non-visual properties of living things; indeed, he did make some errors on non-visual properties of living things in our definition task and was slightly below the normal range for the general non-visual properties of living things in the property verification task. Nevertheless, any problem with non-visual properties in our studies is extremely mild: SE's results are well within the normal range in both the priming and the property verification task. This stands in stark contrast to Laws et al.'s finding that he has a highly significant deficit for associative properties that is far more marked than any problem for visual properties. We now examine this claim with respect to each task in the Laws et al. study.
Definition Generation. Laws et al. reported that SE made a large number of confabulations on associative properties when defining living things (e.g.
penguins live in hot places). In our definition experiment, however, he made very few such errors. The two studies differed in that Laws et al. provided practice trials in which probe questions were asked to elicit properties of different types, whereas we asked subjects to define words without any additional guidelines, to try to collect completely spontaneous definitions. This means it is possible that SE was able to avoid making associative confabulation errors in our task, simply by giving no associative properties at all. However, we know that this is not the case, and that SE generated many (correct) associative properties for the living things-well within the normal range (see Fig. 2 ). Nevertheless, it is likely that part of the reason for the difference in SE's definitions in the two studies does rest on the different task instructions; when specifically asked to generate certain properties, SE may have had to move beyond material he was confident of, revealing a greater problem for associative properties of living things than was apparent in our study. But this does not necessarily mean that he has a selective impairment for this type of knowledge: It is possible that control subjects would also show the same pattern of producing more associative confabulation errors when their knowledge-bas e is probed in greater depth. Even in our unstructured, spontaneous definition task, control subjects make some errors of this type, revealing gaps in their knowledge of living things (in addition to the examples given earlier, the following taken from the larger set of items illustrate this point even more clearly: crocodile -you can only kill it by shooting it through the eye; bee-gathers honey from one plant and flower to another; seal-I'll go for the Antarctic, I'm not quite sure). Further probing would no doubt reveal more gaps and generate more errors. However, Laws et al. do not report data for control subjects on their definition task so we cannot assess whether SE falls within or outside the normal range for these types of error.
Probe Questions and Sorting. Laws et al. carried out tasks in which SE was asked to answer questions about the visual or associative aspects of animals and objects, presented in picture or word form, and a similar task in which he was asked to sort items according to the same properties. In each case, only two properties of each type were tested over the set of animals or objects. Although the tasks suggest that SE was performing poorly on the associative properties of living things, the following objections can be raised. (1) Control data are not reported, and so we do not know whether the associative properties of living things (concerning their diet and habitat) were more difficult than the other conditions. We know from our definition tasks that normal subjects are not always entirely clear about where animals live and what they eat, and so we cannot assume performance would be at ceiling. (2) Because only two properties in each condition were tested it is possible that SE's results are skewed by disproportionate difficulty with just one property, rather than a whole class of properties. This is suggested by the breakdow n of results in the sorting task, where SE's deficit for associative properties is entirely due to his low accuracy on the question about diet (5/18 correct). For the other associative property, concerning the climate of the animal's habitat, he scored much better-15/18. In fact, this score was better than for one of the visual properties (whether the animal has hooves or claws; 14/18). (3) A related problem is that SE may have had difficulty with certain property questions because of problems understanding the property description (e.g. the difference between forests and open plains) rather than because he did not know about the animal in question.
The most comparable task to these in our study is the property verification test. In this task, performance was compared to that of a control group, a wide range of properties were probed, and SE's understanding of the property descriptors was checked in a post-test. Under these conditions we found no evidence that SE had difficulty with associative properties of living things as a whole.
Sentence Verification. The third major task presented by Laws et al. is a speeded sentence verification task. SE makes significantly more errors and his latencies are significantly longer to verify true associative properties of animals than in the three other conditions (visual properties of animals, associative or visual properties of objects). These data appear quite compelling because SE's performance in this condition is clearly depressed compared to the others, and he differs from control subjects, who show no difference between visual and associative properties of animals. However, some of the same problems can be identified as in the previous tasks. (1) Although control data are reported here, they are for the group of 45 Cambridge undergraduates reported by Laws, Humber, Ramsey, and McCarthy (1995) . These subjects are not matched for age and level of education to SE, and it is possible that a more closely matched group would have shown similar responses to SE. (2) The number of properties tested in each condition is small. Laws, Humber, et al. (1995) appear to have included only seven true trials in each of the four category × property type conditions. Therefore, SE would only need have difficulty with a few specific items to produce an error rate as high as 30%in the associative animal condition. From the degrees of freedom reported in the analysis, it appears that SE was presented with each item several times. Nevertheless, he may have made a mistake on the same two or three items on each occasion. (3) As discussed earlier, SE may have had problems with some of the words used to describe properties in the associative animal condition.
Visual Properties of Living Things: Impaired or Intact
In addition to the conflicting claims about SE's knowledge of associative properties, our study also fails to replicate Laws et al.'s finding that he has intact knowledge of the visual properties of living things. In all the tests we carried out, SE was consistently outside the normal range for this type of information, and significantly worse than for other properties. We now examine the evidence for these claims in the various tasks.
Picture Naming. Laws et al. argue that SE has relatively good naming performance for living things and that this is a result of his intact visual semantic knowledge, which allows him to identify animals even when he cannot retrieve other kinds of information about them. However, although SE's naming impairment for living things is milder than the profound anomia reported in some other category-specific patients, it is nevertheless a consistent one; present on the Snodgrass and Vanderwort picture set, the Hodges, Salmon, and Butters (1982) semantic battery, as well as on our new set of familiarity-matched pictures. Comparisons with the normal control range, and statistical comparison of living vs. non-living things, reveal that SE's naming impairment for living things relative to non-living things is a significant one. The claim that SE's naming performance is good for living things and reflects intact visual semantic information is therefore not a strong one 15 .
Definitions. In Laws et al.'s definition task, SE appears to be generating an adequate amount of visual properties for living things, whereas in our study he produced significantly fewer of these properties than did controls. One difference between the studies is that the amount of information is reported differently; Laws et al. report the number of items for which information of each type is generated, whereas we have reported the total number of properties of each type for living and non-living things. However, this is not the basis of the discrepancy. If we calculate SE's responses in the same way as Laws et al., we find that he gave a visual property for only 5/10 living things (normal range 8-10), compared to 9/10 for non-living things (normal range 1-10). The major problem in interpreting the Laws et al. data, as discussed earlier, is that control scores are not provided, and so we do not know whether SE's generation of visual properties is within the normal range. We cannot assume that all types of property will be given in equal numbers by control subjects. For example, our data demonstrate that control subjects give significantly fewer visual properties for non-living things than in any other condition. If we did not have this information, we may have mistakenly interpreted SE's low number of properties in this condition as reflecting a selective deficit for visual properties of non-living things, rather than simply showing the normal pattern.
Probe Questions and Sorting. In these tasks, Laws et al. argue that SE shows good knowledge of visual properties of living things. Several problems 15 It is possible that SE's milder anomia than other HSE patients is a result of his lesion being primarily confined to the right hemisphere, with the left hemisphere, generally thought to be necessary for activation of lexical labels, largely intact (cf. Gainotti et al., 1995) . with the interpretation of these studies have already been discussed. Most notable here is the point that the inclusion of only a very few individual properties means that SE's performance may be very different, depending on which property we look at. As already noted, in the sorting task, one of the visual properties (hooves/claws) produces more errors than one of the associative properties (climate), weakening the claim that visual properties in general are intact. Because SE's deficit for the visual properties of living things is, admittedly, a mild one, he will score correctly for some visual properties for some animals. By testing only a restricted range of such properties it is possible to overestimate his performance. In our property verification task, which includes a wide range of properties, we do see a significant impairment for visual properties of living things, especially those that are distinctive rather than shared by many category members.
Sentence Verification. Perhaps the most compelling evidence that SE has intact visual semantics for animals comes from Laws et al.'s sentence verification task, in which he can verify the animal-visual property statements as fast and almost as accurately as object-visual statements. This contrasts with our priming study, in which he showed a selective lack of priming for the visual properties of living things. However, the pattern here may also be partly due to the small number of different items in the Laws et al. study. The wider range of properties in our tasks mean that they may have been more sensitive in picking up SE's mild deficit for visual properties of living things.
Summary
We have suggested a number of possible reasons why Laws et al.'s data may have presented a different picture of SE's deficit than our own. The earlier study may have overestimated SE's difficulty with associative properties and underestimated his impairment for visual properties. We do not claim, however, to have provided a complete answer to the question of why the two studies differ so markedly. Nevertheless, the fact that SE shows the same pattern of selective difficulty with visual properties of living things over several very different tasks (semantic priming, definition generation, property verification, drawing from memory) suggests that this is an accurate reflection of his underlying deficit. Because this deficit is a mild one, it was crucial to test across a wide range of materials and to carry out detailed comparisons with patterns of normal performance, in order to reveal it.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The starting question for our investigation was whether SE would show a general deficit for visual semantic properties, or a selective deficit affecting only living things. Our results converge to suggest that the deficit is truly selective in that it affects living things but leaves non-living things entirely unscathed. This was the case even when familiarity of the concepts in the living thing and non-living thing categories was closely matched. On the face of it, this all-or-none pattern is more consistent with the localised account of semantic memory, in which living things and non-living things are represented separately, than with the distributed account, in which we would expect to see a more graded effect of brain damage, as shown by Farah and McClelland's (1991) computational model.
The fact that the selective deficit was found in the priming study as well as the off-line tasks argues against one interpretation of De Renzi and Lucchelli's (1994) function-form account, which might otherwise accommodate the pattern of preserved visual properties of non-living objects without positing that representations of living and non-living things are stored in separate areas of the brain. We suggested that if the visual properties of non-living objects are supported by cross-references and inferences from intact non-visual (functional) information, then this process of "indirect" access may be relatively slow and effortful, and so be ineffective under the rapid, automatic access conditions of a priming task. However, this prediction was not supported; SE showed normal priming for visual properties of non-living objects.
However, the pattern of facilitation in the priming task does not rule out all versions of De Renzi and Lucchelli's hypothesis, but only a version in which function-form links are computed as time-consuming, metalinguistic inferences. An alternative interpretation of the account is that function-form correspondences are encoded within the semantic representation for an object, rather than being inferred at an explicit, metalinguistic level. In terms of a connectionist network, there may be excitatory links between certain functional properties (e.g. used for cutting, travels along the road) and corresponding visual properties (has a blade and a handle, has wheels). Such activation links may not exist to such an extent among the functional and visual properties of living things-because their physical forms were not designed to accomplish specific human-related functions. If this is correct, the following account may be possible: Patients with category-specific impairments for living things have a general deficit for visual properties, which consists of significant underactivation of visual property nodes by the input (whether due to noise in the system, altered connection weights, or raised thresholds) 16 . In the case of non-living 16 Describing the deficit as underactivation by the input suggests that it is a problem of access rather than storage, which is not consistent with our earlier suggestion that SE's impairment is one of representation because visual properties of living things did not support priming. However, in a distributed connectionist framework, this distinction becomes very blurred (Rapp & Caramazza, 1993) . On the account we are developing here, the deficit cannot be one of complete loss of visual property nodes, because otherwise they could not be activated by non-visual properties.
things, this is compensated for by activation from the intact functional properties, and so there is no apparent deficit. In the case of living things, there are only a few activation links between non-visual and visual property nodes. Although these may support some general visual properties (e.g. animals that fly will have wings and those that run will have legs), it will not be possible to compensate for loss of more distinctive visual properties of living things. This would explain why SE was less impaired on the general than the distinctive visual properties of living things in the property verification task. Thus, although the current data are consistent with the localised account on which representations in different categories are stored in different areas of the brain, they can also be accounted for in a distributed model that does not posit explicit category boundaries in semantic memory, but which incorporates differences in conceptual structure, such that there are closer inter-relations among functional and visual properties for non-living than for living things. There are several reasons to believe that this may be a plausible approach to capturing the differences in semantic representation for concepts in different semantic categories. On the one hand, there is considerable evidence that the function or design of a man-made object does provide the core of our concept, on which other properties are dependent (e.g. Wierzbiecka, 1985) . On the other, several computational models are now being developed that account for a range of semantic phenomena in terms of the patterns of intercorrelations among semantic properties within conceptual representations. For example, McRae, de Sa, and Seidenberg (in press) have modelled differences in semantic priming for category co-ordinates in normal subjects in terms of the degree of intercorrelation among the semantic features of prime and target, while Gonnerman, Andersen, Devlin, Kempler, and Seidenberg (in press) suggest ways in which the progressive breakdown of semantic knowledge in dementia of the Alzheimer's type may be predicted by the nature of intercorrelations of features within semantic representations. We are also currently developing a connectionist model that incorporates intercorrelations among form and function properties of concepts in a distributed semantic system, and preliminary results suggest that it successfully simulates the predicted patterns of impairment (Tyler, Durrant-Peatfield, Levy, Voice, & Moss, 1996) .
Although the current pattern of data, with a selective problem for the visual properties of living things, is consistent with either the localised storage account or with the form-function version of the distributed account, the latter may provide a more natural account of some more fine-grained patterns of loss and preservation. As pointed out by De Renzi and Lucchelli, there are certain kinds of visual (or other perceptual) properties that do not seem to be closely linked to the intended function of non-living objects, and therefore we would not expect these to be preserved. Their data for Felicia provides some preliminary evidence that this is the case for the colours and sound of objects. Unfortunately our materials were not designed to allow systematic comparisons among relevant types of perceptual property for SE. Our data also impose further constraints on the details of a distributed account, over and above those suggested by De Renzi and Lucchelli (1994) . Specifically, the inter-relations among visual and non-visual properties must allow the visual properties of non-living things to be activated rapidly and automatically, such that they can support normal on-line priming in situations where controlled inference processes cannot operate. One line of evidence that suggests that this is a plausible account is that the activation of functional properties of non-living objects is extremely rapid in the process of spoken word recognition for normal listeners (Moss, McCormick, & Tyler, 1995a) . Given that functional properties are activated at least as early as the recognition point of a word, it is feasible that activation would have time to spread to inter-related visual properties in time to support priming at a delay of 200msec after word offset (as was the case in the current priming experiment).
In spite of its speculative nature, the form-function inter-relation account generates several novel predictions. First, as we mentioned earlier, there are certain kinds of visual (or other perceptual) properties that are not closely linked to the intended function of non-living objects, and which should therefore show the same impairment as the visual properties of living things. Second, it should not be possible to find a pattern of impairment in which the visual properties of non-living things are selectively impaired. This is because, if the non-visual properties are intact, they will support knowledge of visual form through the activation links within the semantic representation of objects. The interdependency of visual and non-visual properties for non-living things means that any impairment of their semantic representations should affect both kinds of information. These examples illustrate some of the ways in which the contrasting hypotheses concerning the basis of category-specific impairments for living things may be differentiated in further studies.
